West Australian Medical Negligence Law Blog : West Australian Medical Negligence Lawyer & Attorney : Julian Johnson Law Firm : Medical Malpractice, Cerebral Palsy Litigation

 In this decision delivered by Judge Stevenson of the District Court on 23 December 2009, Judge Stevenson concluded that he had no power to extend the time for commencement of a claim under the 2005 Limitation Act, in relation to a child born prior to such Act's commencement.

The case, in which I am involved on behalf of the child Patrick, relates to alleged negligence on the part of King Edward Memorial Hospital in Patrick's mother's obstetric care in November 1996. Patrick suffers from cerebral palsy which it is alleged arose because of the shortcomings in care.  The allegations of shortcomings of care and that this caused Patrick's cerebral palsy are supported by compelling expert opinions from independent obstetricians, neonatologists, paediatric neurologists and otherwise.  Uncontested medical evidence put before the court spelt out Patrick's significant disability as a consequence of his cerebral palsy.

Prior to November 2005 the law in Western Australia provided that any medical negligence claim against a public hospital alleging negligent care causing birth injury had to be commenced, at the very latest (and this time limit required either the hospital's consent or permission from the court) by the time the child turned six years of age (section 47A Limitation Act 1935).  Such time-limit self evidently could result in gross unfairness and injustice, and for a substantial period of time has been the subject of criticism by judges, law reform bodies and others.  No equivalent applied to private hospitals or private patients in public hospitals (at least in so far as claim was brought against the private obstetrician), against whom the time limit was generally the child's 24th birthday.

In this case it was argued on behalf of Patrick that changes to the limitation laws which came into effect in November 2005 should permit the court a discretion to allow claim to be brought outside the six-year time limit, if warranted as a matter of justice.

As stated at the outset, Judge Stevenson, whilst expressing obvious disappointment at such conclusion, determined that this was not the case and in effect, the changes to the limitation period laws in 2005 were only of prospective effect and did not remedy the injustice arising for children born prior to November 2005 (when such laws came into effect).

An appeal has been commenced to seek the Court of Appeal's decision in relation to this important issue.

The situation specifically with regard to Patrick's case is complicated further by the fact that the failure to begin a claim within the six-year time limit required was caused by the hospital's failure prior to this deadline, to disclose a critical piece of evidence in relation to Patrick's delivery and his mother's obstetric care (the CTG trace relating to such labour).  As Judge Stevenson mentions in passing in his decision, apart from further accentuating the injustice of the six-year time limit, this potentially gives rise to complex legal issues in terms of the hospital's capacity to rely upon such six-year time limit as a defence to the claim.

What is assured is that Judge Stevenson's decision is by no means the end of this matter.

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Reasonably often, clients consult us following the death of a loved one, resulting from apparent negligent medical care.

I have spoken to a potential new client this week, traumatised by the tragic death of their child as a consequence of what seems from the client's account to be clearly negligent care on the part of a GP (who failed to take any action despite complaints that the child had vision disturbance and excruciating headaches for weeks prior to their death).

In Australia, in such circumstances, claim can be brought by the surviving parent/child/relative, but 'only' for the psychological injury suffered by them.  No claim can be brought for the suffering and death per se of the victim of the negligent care.  This is different from the US, though some strange rules appear to apply there (for example see here).

Sadly, the most common situation in which I have seen such claims, concerns negligent obstetric care, leading to the death during childbirth (or in utero) of the baby.  In such claims, the parents' entitlement to compensation for the loss of their child, if it can be shown that the obstetric care was negligent, is limited to compensation for their psychological or psychiatric suffering.  No claim exists for the loss of the child in itself.  No claim can be made for the loss of an opportunity for life by such child.

Further, no claim can be brought at all if all the parents suffer is "normal grief" (whatever this may mean!) falling short of amounting to a psychologically or psychiatrically diagnosable condition.  This is an entirely illogical (and utterly absurd in practice) restriction upon those who can claim.  It is justified on (dodgy) policy grounds of limiting the scope of people able to bring claim.

Clients are often dismayed to hear of these restrictions (as was my client this week), which mean that where death of a child results from negligent care, in most cases, entitlements to compensation will be modest.  For now (and there is no sign of any inclination for the courts to expand the scope or extent of liability at present), unfortunately these limits will however continue to apply, whether fair, just or not.

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It was interesting to read the Sunday Times newspaper's, front page article a week ago in relation to the unnamed obstetrician/ gynaecologist recently struck off from practise in Western Australia. 

I was particularly interested to read the newspapers' editorial column concerning their strong view that the ongoing suppression order, prohibiting publication of the particular Doctors details, was inappropriate. 

There is a clear public interest in the broader community being made aware of the identity of the relevant practitioner (or other doctors in such cases).  This has 2 primary aspects:

• an entitlement on the part of former and prospective patients to be aware of the conduct of this practitioner.
• as a strong deterrent against similar conduct by other health professionals (the “shame” factor) 

Clearly from the report there were 2 factors tempering this, in this particular case.  These no doubt lead to the relevant suppression order being made by Judge Chaney:

1. Firstly, it is clear that though doubts may exist concerning such opinions, there was evidence before the Tribunal that the relevant Doctor was psychiatric fragile and at some risk of suicide or self harm in the event that his name was published. 

As no doubt emphasised by his representative before the Tribunal, the potential for such harm if the suppression order was lifted would seem a very powerful consideration indeed.

2. Secondly, it is clearly the fact that the relevant Doctor is no longer practising in Western Australia or elsewhere in Australia. As such, there is no necessary concern for the Tribunal as to potential harm to future patients coming under his care. 

There is also some suggestion that former patients of the practitioner had been informed of the allegations brought which further ameliorates this consideration.  

In these circumstances, I can well understand Judge Chaney’s conclusions, unpopular though they may be. Certainly though, it would be hoped that once "risk" to the Doctor’s health has reduced, his details will be released.  

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